Content cybercrimes: criminality and censorship in Asia by Broadhurst, Roderic G.
 1
Broadhurst, R.G., 2006, ‘Content Cybercrimes: Criminality and Censorship in Asia’ 
Indian Journal of Criminology, Vol 34 (1&2):11-30. 
 
 
Revised draft working paper 22.11.04  
 
Content Cyber-Crimes: Criminality and Censorship in Asia 
Roderic Broadhurst, University of Hong Kong* 
 
 
 
 
*Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong 
Kong, email: broadie@hkucc.hku.hk. An earlier draft was presented at the Council of Europe 
Conference on Cyber-Crime, Strasbourg, 15–17 September 2004. 
 
[A] Introduction1 
 
Information technologies and computer connectivity, especially via the Internet, have radically 
changed the way the world communicates and help to drive the processes of ‘globalisation’. Time 
and space are seemingly compressed (the ‘death of distance’2) and new ‘digital’ economies emerge 
while markets (legal or illegal) exploit opportunities and create wealth, while governments grabble 
with policing the ‘information super-highways’. Digital divides have also emerged, with many less 
developed countries excluded from competing in this new world, to the disadvantage of their 
economies.3 The digital divide also has consequences for the effective global enforcement of cyber-
crimes: undeveloped and vulnerable IT national infrastructures, coupled with weak IT security and 
                                                 
1 The author is grateful to Senior Inspector Frank Law of the Technology Crime Division of the Hong Kong Police for 
information relating to ‘content’ cyber-crime cases and Dr Lena Zhong for a web search and the translation of Chinese 
websites. 
2 On April 23, 1838 15 days after leaving London the steam ship Great Western arrived in New York breaking the cross-
Atlantic and the city was greeted the next day with the newspaper headlines ‘Annihilation of Space and Time’ the 
average sailing vessel required usually about 40 days for the westward passage although the record for the westward 
passage by mail packet was 17 1/2 days: Fishlock, T. 2004. Conquerors of Time, John Murray: London, p168. 
3 Norris notes that there are many divides between developed and developing nations, social divides between the 
information-rich and poor and differences in the way the technologies are used to enhance political participation; see P. 
Norris (2001). The Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet Worldwide. Cambridge 
University Press. 
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policing, provide ‘safe havens’ and crime ‘rookeries’. As sociologists have recognised, 
‘communities of shared fate’, not necessarily contiguous with nation-states, have now emerged and 
the failure of one to act against crime is sufficient to nullify the positive actions of others. Without a 
seamless web of mutual legal assistance and comity between nations, and without public/private 
partnerships, policing the information superhighway will be impossible and the ‘frontier’ of 
cyberspace will be as lawless as any wild west.  
Advocates of a ‘free’ Internet who suggest that it both encourages civil society and enhances the 
democratisation of otherwise authoritarian regimes have been challenged.4 There is little evidence 
that the Internet has undermined authoritarian regimes5 or has developed faster in those jurisdictions 
with higher literacy levels, political freedom and English proficiency in Asia.6 The Internet’s 
capability as a profound and vibrant vector of free speech is well known, as is its attraction to the 
purveyors of hate, sadistic erotica and child pornography and other menaces whose markets are 
readily cultivated and exploited. The Internet is a market open to all with access to a computer and 
something to say or sell, though there is little evidence that it is awash with ‘snuff movies’, hate 
sites, child pornography or DIY bomb guides. (Recent, if contentious, estimates suggest as little as 
5% of the several million web-pages on the Internet are ‘Adult’.7)  
 
Neither cyber-patrolling, automated web-search crawlers or self-regulatory codes can capture or 
suppress the near infinite variety of harmful content now present on the Internet or communicated 
via its exponential connectivity. Nevertheless the struggle for social control over this crucial vector 
of modernity has yet to meet the test of sufficient consensus about what kind of ‘speech’ harms 
matter and the means to prevent it. Activation of law enforcement and the criminalisation of so-
called ‘content’ cyber-crimes are but one approach, often drawn upon because of the presumed 
deterrent and educative role of the law. But the success and credibility of extremist websites is 
usually achieved when watchdog groups or law enforcement seek to shut them down. The success of 
a website depends on its ‘stickiness’ (i.e. the retention of the web-visitor) but often at the cost of 
credibility. The perceived credibility of a website is usually related to the number of non-self-
                                                 
4 N. Hara & Z. Estrada (2003). Hate and peace in a connected world: comparing MoveOn and Stormfront. First Monday, 
8(12). [www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue8_12/hara/index.html] 
5 S. Kalathil & T.C. Boas (2001). The Internet and state control in authoritarian regimes: China, Cuba and the 
counterrevolution. First Monday, 6(8).[ www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_8/hara/index.html] 
6 X.M. Hao & S.K. Chow (2004). Factors affecting Internet development: an Asian survey. First Monday, 9(2).[ 
www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue9_2/hara/index.html] 
7 The much-cited Marty Rimm study published by Time in 1995 which claimed 83.5% of all images on the Internet were 
‘Adult’ has been soundly criticised; see <www.caslon.com.au/censorshipguide2.htm> and 
<www.caslon.com.au/xcontentprofile.htm>. 
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referential links it provides, though most hate sites rely on retaining visitors by providing links that 
are self-referential. 
 
One aspect of cyber-crimes less easy to grasp than the far too common events of identify theft, 
malicious and exploit code, and fraud offences is the problem of ‘content’ crimes. Content crimes 
are not clearly defined and are a heterogeneous category, but the term is often meant to refer to the 
‘undesired’ and illegal substance of an image or text communicated via computers and the Internet. 
It appears that content crime equates with the dissemination of offensive materials: 
pornography/child pornography; online gaming/betting; racist material; and treasonous or 
sacrilegious material. It also may include the activities of stalkers or harassers that target victims via 
e-mail. For practical purposes the notion of content crime does not usually include the creation of 
counterfeit or surrogate identities, misleading advertising and other deliberately deceptive 
representations with fraudulent purposes – although all of these may play some part in the substance 
of web-pages, spam (as in the case of the ‘419’ frauds) or other communications content that have 
been criminalised. 
 
[A] ‘Content’ offences and the Council of Europe Additional Protocol 
 
Only a few specific content offences have been criminalised. The best known and most universal of 
these relate to the production and distribution of child pornography, the promotion of or trafficking 
in narcotic and psychotropic drugs, hate or racial/ethnic vilification crimes and, in Europe at least, 
gross denials of genocide episodes. The Council of Europe (CoE) Cyber-crime Convention that 
came into force in early 2004 is one of the first international treaties to criminalise the distribution of 
child pornography via computers, so this is one of the few content crimes to attract widespread 
consensus.8 This provision reinforces the ‘Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child’ on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography approved in the May 2000 
session of the UN General Assembly.9 Although the Cyber-crime Convention has developed an 
Additional Protocol signed by 23 nations addressing racial/ethnic vilification and genocide denial, 
                                                 
8 Child pornography is the only ‘content’ offence cited by the Transnational Crime Working Group of CSCAP (Council 
for Security Cooperation Asia Pacific) in its report Cyber-crime and its Effects on the Asia Pacific Region; see 4 August, 
at <http//www.police.govt.nz/events/2001/e-crime-forum/cybercrime_and_its_effects.html>. 
9 The optional protocol was signed by PR China on 6 September 2000 and ratified by the National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee on 29 August 2002. 
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this is yet to be ratified. The aim is to harmonise substantive criminal law in the fight against racism 
and xenophobia on the Internet and improve international cooperation in this area.10  
 
The Additional Protocol specifies the putative criminal offence of dissemination of racist and 
xenophobic material through computer systems via threat or insult – where public insult of a person 
or group of persons occurs because they belong to or are thought to belong to a group distinguished 
by specific characteristics. ‘Insult’ refers to any offensive, contemptuous or invective expression that 
prejudices the honour or dignity of a person, and such expression is directly connected with the 
insulted person’s belonging to the group. Unlike threats, an insult expressed in private 
communications is not outlawed, presumably on the practical grounds that ‘thoughts’ cannot be 
policed. In short, there is a distinction between ‘abusive expression’ and ‘offensive expression’, the 
former targeting persons, the latter ideas.11  
 
In addition, the denial, gross minimisation, approval or justification of genocide or crimes against 
humanity is also criminalised. These behaviours have also inspired, stimulated and encouraged racist 
and xenophobic groups and are not limited to Nazi atrocities but include serious crimes against 
humanity established by other international courts set up since 1945 by relevant international law 
(such as UN Security Council Resolutions and multilateral treaties).12 This Article allows reference 
to final and binding decisions of future international courts recognised by the parties to the Protocol. 
The provision is intended to ensure that established historical facts may not be denied, grossly 
minimised, approved or justified in order to support racist and xenophobic ideologies and 
                                                 
10 The definition of content refers to written material (e.g. texts, books, magazines, statements, messages), images (e.g. 
pictures, photos, drawings) or any other representation of thoughts or theories, of a racist and xenophobic nature, in such 
a format that it can be stored, processed and transmitted by means of a computer system. The definition contained in the 
Protocol refers to conduct that may arise from the content of the material rather than to the expression of feelings or 
belief or aversion alone. The conduct involved must also be done ‘without right’ and may be lawful not only in cases 
where classical legal defences like consent, self-defence or necessity apply, but where other principles limit liability (e.g. 
for law enforcement, academic or research purposes). The Protocol excludes conduct undertaken by lawful government 
authority (e.g. where government acts to maintain public order, protect national security or investigate criminal 
offences). Offences must also be committed ‘intentionally’ for criminal liability to apply, although ‘intention’ is left to 
national interpretation. Thus an ISP cannot be held criminally liable merely because it served as a conduit for offensive 
material, or hosted a website or newsroom containing such material, without the required intent under domestic law, and 
an ISP is not required to monitor such conduct to avoid criminal liability. See G. Esposito. (2004). The Council of 
Europe Convention on Cyber-crime: A Revolutionary Instrument? In R. Broadhurst (Ed.). Proceedings of the 2nd Asia 
Cyber Crime Summit. Centre for Criminology: University of Hong Kong. 
11 As per the argument of L. McNamara (2002). Regulating racism: Racial vilification laws in Australia. Sydney: 
Federation Press; see also J. Jacobs & K. Potter (1998). Hate Crimes: Criminal Law and Identity Politics, Oxford 
University Press. 
12 For example, the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, the Permanent International Criminal 
Court for Rwanda as well as the International Military Tribunal, established by the 1945 London Agreement. 
 5
behaviour.13 Like the US 1999 Hate Crime Prevention Act, such attempts at criminalisation are 
likely to face numerous challenges through the courts. White supremacist websites such as 
‘Stormfront’, ‘Front14’ and others of this ilk may skirt these conditions and continue to proliferate14 
– although Yahoo and French ISPs may have seen business interests at risk rather than censorship as 
the motive for desisting with accounts of the ‘Front14’ kind. 
 
The Chinese have repeatedly demanded that the Japanese authorities undertake measures to suppress 
the not infrequent cases of what they regard as historical misrepresentations of the 1937–45 Sino-
Japanese war that appear both in academic texts and ultra-nationalist Japanese websites. Most 
sensitive of these misrepresentations is the outright denial or underplay of the notorious massacre of 
Nanjing in 1937 – by conservative estimates 200,000 Chinese citizens were murdered by rampant 
Japanese Imperial troops after the occupation of the city.15 The Shinto Yasukuni (‘peaceful country’) 
Shrine located in Tokyo and founded in 1869 to commemorate Japan’s war dead16 has also become a 
source of controversy since 1978 when 14 class A war criminals were enshrined among the 2.5 
million war dead. Periodic visits to the shrine by several Japanese prime ministers, including the 
current incumbent, have caused concerns within Japan as a violation of the constitutional separation 
of church and state. For Asian countries, particularly China, the shrine has become a symbol of 
Japanese militarism and ultra-nationalism, and prime ministerial visits are perceived as a form of 
genocide denial.17  
 
Unlike China, Japan (one of the four nations outside the Council of Europe who participated in the 
drafting of the Convention) is a signatory to the Convention, but Japan is yet to consider the 
Additional Protocol.18 The Protocol is a mechanism that may offer some prospect of curtailing the 
more virulent forms of denial emanating from xenophobic groups in Japan and in China, where 
                                                 
13 Paraphrased from Esposito, The Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-crime. 
14 See HateWatch.org and the Simon Wiesenthal Centre estimated there were 3000 problematic Internet sites in 2002 and 
the Southern Poverty Law Centre noted 405 extremists; see Hara & Estrada, Hate and peace in a connected world.  
15 See Takeshi Yoshida (1999). A Japanese Historiography of the Nanjing Massacre, 
<http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ccba/cear/issues/fall99/text-only/yoshida.htm>.  
16 The deities of about 2.5 million people who died serving Japan in domestic and overseas conflicts including the Meiji 
Restoration, the Satsuma Rebellion and other domestic conflicts, the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, 
the First World War, the Manchurian Incident, the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War are enshrined at 
Yasukuni Shrine in the form of mortuary tablets. The Yushukan, a museum commemorating Japan’s wars, is located 
next to the shrine’s main buildings. 
17 Attempts to solve the problem by creating an alternative shrine for Japan’s war dead or by removing the war criminals 
from the Yasukuni Shrine have failed due to the refusal of its Shinto guardians to relinquish a national tradition. 
18 There are at present 23 signatories to the additional protocol but as yet no ratification; see 
<conventions.coe.int/Treaty>. 
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distinct anti-Japanese rhetoric can reach the level of vilification as in <www.japanpig.com>, the 
website of the ‘anti-Japan pioneers’.19 Even a cursory inspection of bulletin boards and chat rooms 
would have noted strident anti-Japanese sentiments during the August 2004 Asian Football Cup held 
in Beijing. In both jurisdictions, ‘hactivism’ has been one of the consequences of the unresolved 
tensions. There is even an anti-Japan virus, a derivation of W32-Welchina-B that targets computer 
systems in Japanese but not those in Chinese, Korean or English; this same ‘anti-Japanese virus’ 
downloads helpful Microsoft patches.  
 
The UN Transnational Organised Crime Convention (in force from September 2003) also 
universally criminalised those who use computers to organise the smuggling of humans or the 
exploitation of woman and children (sex slavery), and the trafficking of firearms and explosives 
(awaiting ratification) or the pursuit of serious organised crime are also universally deplored and 
subject to sanction. Presumably communications containing content in respect to these activities are 
equally subject to law enforcement. 
 
Websites devoted to terrorism as well as those devoted to fraud apply deceptive content (as in the 
substance of their text and imagery) to enable their anonymous operators to justify murder or 
commit theft. Is the creator of a website or a spammer who displays a video of an execution 
(unlawful or lawful) or offers miracle cures, promotes euthanasia, provides games of chance or sells 
unusual and sadistic erotica committing a ‘content’ crime? The definition of what constitutes crime 
is essentially a political process and the answer to questions of this kind ultimately rests on the 
political responses that are mobilised by (‘moral panics’ or otherwise) the social values and interests 
that are offended. 
 
This paper briefly explores the issue of ‘content’ cyber-crime in the Asian context and discusses the 
likely response to the problems of deviant expression on the Internet. Although censorship backed 
with sanctions, the usual response to the problem of ‘content’ crime’, is anathema to the utopian 
architects of the Internet, this should not imply that web-pages or mass spam attachments are any 
different from print media and therefore outside the standards normally applied to the mass media. 
 
                                                 
19 The homepage features a photo of an entertainment centre in Xiangtan, Hunan (Chairman Mao’s hometown), which 
has a statue of a kneeling Japanese soldier with a sign saying ‘bad Japanese are not welcome’. 
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[A] Context 
 
Although data on uptake and penetration of computer connectivity and Internet growth in Asia are 
subject to estimation errors and are rapidly outdated, there were an estimated 64 million Internet 
users in Asia in 2000,20 expected to reach 242 million by 2005.21 According to the International Data 
Corporation, between 1998 and 2003 Asia as a whole saw a compound annual growth rate in 
Internet users of 40%, with India (76%), China (51%) and South Korea (49%) leading.22 China in 
2002 had 56.6 million people, increasing to 87 million by mid-2004,23 who could access the Web 
from their home, overtaking Japan as the largest group in Asia. Chinese access has been 
optimistically estimated to reach 257 million or 20% of Chinese households by the close of 2006 – 
exceeding numbers estimated in North America.24 According to CNNIC’s ‘14th Statistical Report on 
Internet Development in China’, as of mid-2004 China had 36.3 million hosts, 382, 216 CN domain 
names, 6.27 million WWW sites, 31.1 million broadband users and the widespread uptake of a full 
range of services (e.g. search engines, online banking, auctions, advertising, online news and VOD, 
e-mail, SMS etc.), while 38% of the population have used the Internet to make online purchases.25 
Hong Kong also has a high percentage of Internet users, with 64.1% of local households connected 
to the Internet. Singapore (55.6%), South Korea (52.7%), Taiwan (49.8%) and Japan (48%) have the 
highest level of Internet penetration and only Myanmar remains to provide public access to the 
Internet (see Table 1).26  
 
Table 1 Internet penetration in Asia 
 
1995  2002 
Australia* 3.5  46.0 
Bangladesh 0  0.1 
Bhutan  0  0.1 
Brunei  1.03  9.9 
                                                 
20 S. Chuang (2000). Untapped Asian Market Offers Huge Potential – E-Commerce. SCMP, 13 June. 
21 N. Squires & S. Luk (2002). Fraud taints one in 10 Asia deals. SCMP, 23 January. 
22 Chuang, Untapped Asian Market; but note that Broadband access also differs with Hong Kong at 77% of Internet users 
compared to 26% of Japanese and 9% of Australian users. 
23 China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC), http://www.cnnic.net.cn/evolution.shtml, and the most recent 
details of the 14th Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, 20 July 2004 can be found in English at 
<http://www.cnnic.net.cn/en/index/0O/02/index.htm> visited 6 September 2004. 
24 D. Nairne (2002). China to have most Internet users in 4 years. SCMP, 23 April. 
25 Ibid., note 22. 
26 See Hao & Chow, Factors affecting Internet development; and Region in the grips of Internet explosion. SCMP, 8 
July. 
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Cambodia 0  0.1 
China  0  3.5 
Hong Kong 3.28  64.1 
India   0.03  0.7 
Indonesia 0.03  1.8 
Japan  1.59  48.0 
Kazakhstan 0.01  0.7 
Korea Sth 0.81  52.7 
Laos  0  0.2 
Macau  0.28  23.0 
Malaysia 0.2  24.4 
Maldives 0  3.6 
Mongolia 0.01  1.6 
Myanmar 0  0 
Nepal  0  0.2 
Pakistan  0  0.3 
Philippines 0.03  2.5 
Singapore  3.38  55.6 
Sri Lanka  0.006  0.8 
Taiwan  1.17  49.8 
Tajikistan N/A  0.1 
Thailand 0.9  5.7 
Turkmenistan N/A  0.1 
Uzbekistan N/A  0.6 
Vietnam  0  0.5 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: cited in Hao & Chow; and <www.InternetWorldStats.com?; * Australian Bureau of Statistics (2003) 
 
In the end it is more likely to be the urban/rural divide that will determine Internet access in Asia. 
Malicious and exploit code are significant global problems and now appear to be generated from 
within the region as much as from outside.27  
                                                 
27 According to the US security firm Riptech 2002, hacker attacks on corporate computer networks continue to increase. 
Forty per cent focused on specific targets, and financial services and power and energy companies bore more than twice 
the number of any other sector, indicating that hackers are now focusing on crucial systems. The report found that the 
largest number of attacks originated in the United States (30%), followed by South Korea (9%), China (8%) and France 
(4.5%); see D. Willis, ‘United States leads as source of virus invasions’, SCMP, 11 February 2003. In Hong Kong alone 
the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) received 1500 reported incidents from 11 to 20 August 2003 as a 
result of Blaster B and So Big F. A Hong Kong Productivity Council 2000 survey revealed that one in three companies 
in Hong Kong had detected breaches of their security system in the previous 12 months; M. Carlson (2000). Firms 
plagued by computer viruses. SCMP, 12 July. 
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[A] Content crime means different things  
 
This paper briefly addresses the problem of ‘content’ crime in cyberspace by looking at both cases 
and the development of countermeasures within the Asian region. The focus, however, is largely 
confined to North Asia because this is in part the most advanced IT jurisdiction: South Korea, Japan 
and Hong Kong SAR have developed some measures to address spamming, pornography (especially 
child pornography), illegal gaming and hate or racist content on the Internet. The role of ‘Internet 
content’ policing is also briefly discussed in respect to PR China and Saudi Arabia, where vigorous 
efforts have been made to broadly control news or religion-related content that is seen as contrary to 
state interests. These forms of ‘nanny state’ censorship are not all based on filtering or blocking but 
often rely on proactive strategies such as the promotion of e-governance and services. For example, 
in China the Internet and ICT is encouraged, so self-censorship is promoted and control by the 
bureaucracy is often fragmented; in Cuba, on the other hand, access itself is strictly limited.28 
 
One current example from PR China may suffice. The Falun Gong is a spiritual movement based on 
the notion of the natural power of chi or qigong or life force, and its adherents claim extraordinary 
benefits in the various mediation and physical exercises it promotes.29 The Chinese authorities, after 
appearing to support these ‘physical health’ movements, now regard this movement and other 
qigong (e.g. Zhong Gong) as promoting superstition and feudalist beliefs contrary to the PR China 
constitution and have vigorously suppressed Falun Gong associations and have blocked Falun Gong 
websites and monitored bulletin boards and chat rooms, including those from abroad. The 
government sees qigong as ‘spreading fallacies, hoodwinking people, inciting and creating 
disturbances and jeopardizing social stability’ and promoting ‘superstition and malicious fallacies to 
deceive people, resulting in the deaths of many practitioners’.30 A People’s Daily editorial in July 
1999 urged that ‘Party members, government officials, and the people as a whole should understand 
that this is a serious ideological and political struggle which has bearing on the fundamental beliefs 
of Party members, on the basic ideological foundation for the Chinese people’s cause and unity, and 
                                                 
28 See Kalathil & Boas, ‘The Internet and state control.  
29 Falun Gong was established in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1992 as a healthy, spiritual and moral exercise 
program by Li Honhzhi, but was banned as a political-cult movement in 1999. On 25 April 1999 an estimated 10,000 
Falun Gong staged a peaceful demonstration outside the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) headquarters in Beijing to 
demand official recognition and this appears to have triggered the official ban. 
30 See Kalathil & Boas, ‘The Internet and state control, and K.C. Wong, 2004, The Criminalization of Falun Gong in 
China: A Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the People, unpublished paper – with permission of the author. 
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on the future of the Party and state’.31 It could be argued that by applying both reactive proactive 
forms of Internet censorship, China has been successful in both suppressing qigong (Internet) 
activism and blunting the potential criticisms of its actions. 
 
The notion of ‘content’ crime in cyber-space reflects more mundane concerns about the medium of 
the Internet as a vehicle for transmitting and promoting undesirable, amoral or harmful values and 
behaviour. In addition, the notion that a mere image or text or website can be harmful and therefore 
the necessary subject of criminalisation challenges liberal traditions of free speech. Nevertheless, the 
making of certain images sometimes violates the human rights of those involved (as in the case of 
child or sadistic pornography) and some texts inflame racial, sacred or national hatred, causing loss 
of life and property in too many incidents. Indeed manipulation of information without any of these 
‘classic’ forms can cause harm that no society can tolerate, as in the example cited below of the HK 
false ‘quarantine crisis’ during the SARS outbreak in southern China in 2003.  
 
Individuals can use computers to create social unrest and in Hong Kong a 14-year-old boy was 
arrested for creating a false website, purportedly authorised by a well-regarded local newspaper. He 
posted on that website false information concerning the SARS epidemic, stating that Hong Kong 
would be declared a closed port. This caused widespread panic in the Hong Kong community. One 
consequence was panic over the quarantine closure, resulting in besieged supermarkets. Calm was 
only restored some hours later when the government issued repeated public announcements denying 
the rumour. The boy was arrested and charges were laid after investigators traced the origin of the 
false site to his computer. He was placed under social welfare care for 12 months (HKSAR v Sum 
Cheuk Wa, FLS 700017/2003). A similar case occurred in Beijing in June 2003. A resident was 
sentenced to three years for publishing false articles on various websites about the SARS virus. This 
caused people to stockpile goods and the Chinese papers reported that ‘a horrible atmosphere was 
created and social order was disrupted’.32 
                                                 
31 See Senior CPC Official on Falun Gong Prohibition. People’s Daily Online, 24 July 1999. Falun Gong was banned 
under the ‘Regulations on Registering and Managing Mass Organizations’, which require that mass organizations be 
registered, abide by China’s constitution, laws, regulations and policies, and should not violate the fundamental 
principles of the constitution or jeopardise the interests of the nation and people or of other organisations. It was the 
position of the PRC government that Falun Dafa Research Society and the Falun Gong had not been registered, and was, 
therefore, illegal. See Chinese Official Says Falun Gong Ban Follows Chinese Law. People’s Daily Online, 24 July 
1999.  
32 A man was sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment for dissemination of false information on the Internet. Metro News, 12 
June 2003; see also the case of a young man was convicted in Hong Kong in 2002 and sentenced to 12 months’ 
imprisonment as a result of his cyber-stalking activities. He had accessed victims’ computers and sent them e-mails 
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With the exception of child pornography and the promotion of sex tourism, little consensus is 
apparent within the Asian region about what might constitute ‘content’ crimes, and in general 
notions of obscenity and pornography/erotica widely vary across the region. Erotic materials, 
sometimes blatantly sadistic, available on Japanese and to a lesser degree on Chinese, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong websites would clearly offend many other jurisdictions but present classic dilemmas 
about what is obscene or offensive. However, there are simply no reliable estimates of the number or 
websites or audiences engaged in pornography and as one sceptic noted, ‘they exaggerate 
everything, especially the size’.33 Nor is it likely that the industry that purveys such erotica will 
develop codes of practice that are accepted throughout the region, especially when many Islamic 
jurisdictions have a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to all kinds of nudity.  
 
Hong Kong’s approach is ‘minimalist and facilitative’.34 ‘Minimalist’ here means that new 
legislation will not be introduced if existing laws are adequate to cover activities in the cyber 
environment. ‘Facilitative’ stresses the importance of partnerships between the Hong Kong 
Government, the industry, academia and the people to promote benevolent Internet use. Following 
the passage of the relevant ‘Prevention of Child Pornography Ordinance’ in December 2003, the 
Hong Kong police in an intelligence-led operation in March 2004 arrested 18 offenders engaged in 
the downloading and possession of child pornography. 
 
When ‘child pornography’ (ertong seqing) was entered into the search engines of Sina.com.cn, 
Baidu.com, and Google.com.hk, all the results, bar one, cover the crackdown on child pornography 
in other countries. The only article to refer briefly to such sites in China noted that seven websites 
‘publicly selling’ child pornography products had been identified by concerned citizens. The report 
found that the ‘special section on little girls’ was the best ‘selling point’ of those websites which 
‘highly recommend’ hundreds of obscene photos including those of girls as young as 5 or 6 years 
being raped.35 The office of ‘sweeping porn and smashing illegal products’ (sao huang da fei) was 
recently established under the auspices of 17 government agencies, including the Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                                   
threatening them, in some cases with rape, and accompanying the messages with lewd pictures (HKSAR v Ko Kam-fai, 
CACC 82 of 2001). 
33 Cited at www.caslon.com.au/xcontentprofile2.htm; the same site notes that the only barriers to entry into the cyber-
porn market are ‘a sense of embarrassment and the lack of a good lawyer’. 
34 E. Leung (2003). More measures set to fight cyber crime, viewed 10 October 2003, 
<http://www.news.gov.hk/en/category/ontherecord/030926/html/030926en11002.htm>. 
35 See <http://www.infosec.org.cn/news/news_detail.php?mID=1540> visited 9 September; translated by Lena Zhong. 
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Communist Party Propaganda Department, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Information 
Industry and Ministry of Education (see <http://www.shdf.gov.cn/>), in order to counter the rapid 
growth of porn products and pirated products; it encourages the public to report to its 24-hour hotline 
about porn sites or illegal products in circulation. On 16 July 2004, a national campaign to crack 
down on porn websites began and within ten days about 700 porn websites were shut down.36 
Despite the detailed coverage of the crackdown on child porn in other countries, the focus of 
government and media attentions has been on protecting youth from ‘pornographic pollution’ rather 
than on the arrest of the manufacturers and purveyors of child pornography in China. 
 
There is, however, growing concern about the role of the Internet in promoting racial/ethnic hatred 
in many Asian countries, particularly in nations that have large religious minorities such as the 
Philippines and Thailand with large Muslim populations and Indonesia with a significant Christian 
minority. In all these jurisdictions national laws prohibit racial or religious vilification and have 
moved to suppress these forms of expression on the Internet and in the print media. Inflammatory 
allegations and images of rape and mayhem against Chinese Indonesians during the 2000 riots were 
widely disseminated via Chinese chat rooms and in turn caused anti-Indonesia sentiment to run high 
throughout urban China. During the Cambodian elections in 2003 and 1998, opposition parties 
advocated harsh measures against Vietnamese residents, causing considerable property damage and 
injury among that minority. A script by a Thai TV actress that claimed Angkor Wat as a Thai site in 
2002 was widely disseminated by Cambodian print and radio after appearing on an Internet website 
and chat rooms; the result was the destruction of the Thai Embassy and an estimated $US20 million 
damage bill to Thai businesses in Cambodia before order was restored. Images of the Thai King’s 
portrait being trampled on by Cambodian rioters were shown repeatedly on Thai television, in turn 
causing expressions of anti-Cambodian feeling on the streets of Bangkok.37 The very volatility of 
these behaviours and their vulnerability to misinformation and racial/ethnic vilification renders the 
control of inflammatory content a matter of serious concern to law enforcement agencies tasked with 
public order, throughout the region. 
 
[A]Accessing content for investigative purposes 
 
                                                 
36 See <http://news.sohu.com/20040727/n221227710.shtml> visited 9 September; translated by Lena Zhong. 
37 Phnom Penh Post, 13, July 2002. 
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Content is the data contained in a communication, and access is generally more tightly controlled 
than access to traffic data. In many cases laws permit access to content processed by ISPs. But if the 
subject is using a computer within a corporate network, or where data is transmitted in encrypted 
form over a virtual private network, actual content may not be available from ISPs. In these cases 
legislation may need to allow the preservation of, and access to, content on those networks. Again, 
legislation should balance the needs of law enforcement with the burden on parties in collecting and 
storing the data. Also geo-location approaches (e.g. Quova, NetGeo, javanetlocator) that matches a 
user’s Internet address with a place is a developing (if fraught) technology that has the potential to 
make the Internet less borderless than supposed and already has a role in identifying content crimes 
and fraud.38  
 
ISPs and system administrators are often confused by seemingly conflicting requirements to collect, 
store and allow access to information on the one hand and requirements to protect privacy and 
ensure secrecy of communications and information on the other. The situation is further complicated 
where multiple law enforcement agencies are involved or where ISPs operate in multiple 
jurisdictions. There is a need for governments to provide clear guidance to ISPs and system 
administrators on their obligations and the processes involved in complying with lawful requests for 
collection and storage of information and access to it. A separate question is the need for 
governments to recognise legitimate security activities when framing legislation. This particularly 
concerns tools that can be legitimately used for security testing but illegitimately to access or 
damage computer systems. Legislation will need to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate use.39 
Identifying and prosecuting harmful content sites will not be easy and borrowing some of the 
techniques and approaches of the anti-counterfeit and IP protection may be helpful.40 
 
                                                 
38 See generally B. Schneier (2000). Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World, New York: Wiley. 
39 S. Orlowski. (2004). APEC  Activities to Address Cybercrime Through Public/Private Cooperation. Proceedings of 
the 2nd Asia Cyber crime Conference. University of Hong Kong. 
40 The Business Software Alliance (BSA) 2001 Piracy Report found that the overall piracy rate in the Asia-Pacific region 
had increased after declining steadily between 1994 and 1999. The regional revenue loss to software corporations was 
estimated to be US$4.7 billion in 2001. The highest piracy rates in Asia and the world were Vietnam 94% and China 
92%. The BSA estimates that stolen software cost the industry US$13.1 billion in 2002 (see P. Grabosky & R, Smith 
(2001). Crime in the Digital Age. Cambridge University Press, p. 7). In the Asia-Pacific region alone, the estimated theft 
in software copyright theft was US$5.5 billion. It has been suggested that one in three computer software programs sold 
worldwide is a counterfeit. In 2002 the sale of pirated CDs rose 14% to 1.1 billion – more than double the previous three 
years. It cost the industry US$4.6 billion according to the International Federation of Phonographic Industry; B. Warner, 
‘Sales of Pirated CDs top 1 billion 2002’, Bangkok Post, 11 July 2003. 
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Interventions such as Microsoft’s bounty on virus software writers, IFPI’s general focus on 
deterrence to frighten the average law-abiding ‘music pirate’ may not be applicable to suppressing 
content crime. Although such an emphasis on deterrence by paying as much attention to small and 
big players may offer some relief, it is unlikely to deter ardent racists. However, BSA’s41 
deployment of automated ‘web-crawling’ software to identify bogus or illegal websites is a yet 
unproved measure, despite impressive efforts shown in Table 2. Cyber-patrols can be automated but 
nevertheless still require human intelligence to sort through ‘hits’ identified via key word and other 
search techniques. Apart from the vastness of the task, Chinese script poses technical problems for 
these methods. It is acknowledged that ‘web-crawler’ technology is imperfect and that ‘take-down’ 
notices do not end infringing websites but often displace them to other jurisdictions or lead to their 
reinvention in less detectable form. 
 
Table 2: BSA Automated ‘web-crawler’ activity, January–September 2003 
————————————————————————————————— 
Region   Infringing sites  ‘Take-down’ notices  
————————————————————————————————— 
Asia    38,907     15,242 
Europe    483,659  17,739 
Latin America   83,524    17,650 
North America   634,267  87,723 
 
All    1,240,357  138,354 
————————————————————————————————— 
 
Table 2 suggests that most of the identified activity takes place in Europe (39%) and North America 
(51%), but effective ‘take-down’ is very low in Europe (3.7%) and North America (13.8%) 
compared to Asia (39.2%) and Latin America (21.1%). It is most likely that the relatively low 
identification of infringing sites in Asia is a function of the present inefficiency and special problems 
faced by search engines encountering Chinese (either traditional or simplified) and other non-
European languages. Indeed the need for such multilingual search engines is a major research 
priority and may prove highly useful in increasing the risks of interdiction for cyber-criminals. As 
criminologists would recognise, data of the kind reported in Table 2 is more likely to reflect the 
                                                 
41 The BSA was founded in 1988 with the purpose of protecting the copyright of the computer software industry and now 
operates in 68 countries.  
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activity of the enforcers than of the criminals, and basic research on the prevalence, nature and 
gravity of cyber-crime is essential. At present too little is known about the patterns of criminality or 
victimisation and this reflects the low priority given to fundamental criminological research in 
preference for research on technological fixes. 
 
Within Asia, the Japanese National Police Agency (NPA) has established an international 
investigative cooperation framework, the Cyber-crime Technology Information Network System 
(CTINS) and has been promoting measures in accord with the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Cyber-crime, which the Government of Japan has now adopted.42 The focus to date has been on 
traditional theft offences and child pornography, while little effort has been made to address the civic 
need to suppress ‘hate speech’. However, prefectural police hold regular Connection Conferences 
with ISPs which include training and information-sharing, especially with regard to countermeasures 
against cyber-crime, such as exclusion of illegal and harmful information on the Internet. 
Defamation offences have been pursued against individuals and web-page creators. They also play 
an active part in public education about information security, cooperating with consumer unions and 
educational institutions so as to protect citizens from the danger and damage of cyber-crime. 
Moreover, the police conduct seminars about information security for the staff of educational 
institutions, public institutions and private enterprises and exchange opinions with them in order to 
improve information security consciousness.43 
 
[A] Unsolicited Commercial Email (UCE) and Spam  
 
Another menace, with equally insidious effects, is the rapid spread of ‘spamming’. This is one vector 
for the spread of ‘content’ crime, often helped along by the availability of ubiquitous CDs offering 
300 million addresses for US$99. Organisations such as ‘SpamCop’ and ‘StopSpam’ actively target 
irresponsible spammers and their ISPs, while more effective filtering can blunt the impact but rely 
on the user being an active player. In Korea pioneering responses to the ubiquitous menace of 
‘spam’ have been developed by the Korean Information Security Agency (KISA).44 In the Korean 
                                                 
42 T. Sato (2004). Cyber crime countermeasures in Japan. Proceedings of the 2nd Asia Cyber crime Conference. 
University of Hong Kong. 
43 Ibid. 
44 A US federal law is pending on an anti-spam measure that will supersede 37 state laws and increase penalties and 
measures against illegal spam. An Australian Spam Bill was also introduced in 2003: see 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2003-04/04bd045.htm>. A number of proposals have suggested the 
establishment of a dot.XXX cite for Adult pornography. 
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example, efforts to criminalise this conduct and to stress the critical role of consumer awareness 
have proved somewhat effective, but extra-jurisdictional ‘spammers’ still operated with relative 
impunity. KISA provided data that estimated that on average 41 ‘spam’ mails were received per 
person per day in Korea in July 2003; this is down from about 50, but unless spamming is addressed 
e-mail systems are likely to be flooded to extinction.45 KISA noted that many ‘relay servers’ were 
sourced from schools and that improving information security in that sector along with requiring 
ISPs to register bulk mailers may stem the flood of unsolicited commercial e-mail. According to a 
KISA survey, 56% of ‘spam’ involved sexually explicit material, 19% other illegal products, 14% 
fraud-style e-mails, and 11% other forms of advertising.46 
 
A recent Australian Government report found that computers were being used in spam e-mails 
touting black market drugs, celebrity porn, bogus prizes and Nigerian money laundering frauds. The 
findings in the Australian report are also reflected in the result of a recent (May 2003) US Federal 
Trade Commission Study, which found that two-thirds of spam contains one or more fraudulent 
elements. Further, about 18% of all spam studied by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) involved 
pornography or other sexual products.47 In Hong Kong 10–30% of the e-mails received by local 
users were spam according to the Chamber of the Hong Kong Internet Service Providers 
Association, and the amount of spam mail originating in China is increasing with the growing 
population of Internet users in China.48 An anti-spam summit held in Beijing on 24 April 2004 
revealed that on average every Internet customer in China received 19.3 spam e-mails every week, a 
one-third rise compared with the previous year. Since August 2003, the anti-spam section of the 
Internet Society of China has published three ‘blacklists’ of spam URLs (Chinese and overseas) and 
claims that China will become the largest anti-spam market worth 10 billion Chinese dollars.49 
According to a UK anti-spam organisation. ‘Spamhaus Project’, 80% of US spammers have moved 
their servers to the Chinese market, choosing Liaoning as the base.50 According to US anti-spam 
                                                 
45 KISA cited data that estimated spam comprised about 50% of emails but predicted by 2005 80% of emails would be 
spam. Message Labs, an email security system provider, estimates that spam accounted for one in every 2.5 emails in 
2003 compared to one in 11 in 2002 (A.M. Squeo. US House Advances Spam Bill. Asian Wall Street Journal, 10 
December 2003). 
46 Cited in R. Broadhurst (2004). Rapporteur’s Report. Proceedings of the 2nd Asia Cyber crime Conference. University 
of Hong Kong. 
47 Agencies in Washington (2003). Pressure but for anti spam laws. SCMP, 6 May. 
48 S. Luk (2002). HK ignorance spawns spam. SCMP, 1 October. 
49 See IT Times Weekly, 10 June 2004. In 2003 spamming was estimated to be worth 4.8 billion Chinese dollars; see 
<Phoenix.com>, 8 December 2003. 
50 Spamhaus traced two ‘mystical messages’ sent by the US ‘spam king’ Alan Ralsky to Fushun and Dandong in 
Liaoning province; Lei Zhonghui, ‘21 Century Economic Report’, 26 May 2004. 
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company ‘Commtouch’, which followed through 300,000 spam messages in 2003, 71% used servers 
in China. However, rather than suggesting that the senders of spam messages are Chinese Internet 
users, the company found the spammers were more likely from the United States or Europe.51  
 
A good example of the use of computers in committing fraud through spamming was seen in a case 
uncovered in the United States in 2002, which involved fraudulent e-mails. The fraudsters had 
spammed computers promising the recipients free Sony play-station games. Those who responded 
were directed to a bogus website that instructed them to download a program which allowed them to 
collect the prize. The program in fact connected them to a pornographic website which charged them 
US$3.99 per minute. The product delivered was offensive to adults and totally inappropriate for 
children. The fraudsters took in US$11 million. The website was shut down and the FTC sought to 
recover the money obtained.52 The spamming of ‘419’ advanced fee fraud letters is also a 
widespread phenomenon but has not led to any arrests in Hong Kong. E-mail header analysis 
suggested that the e-mails were mostly send via an open server relay located in the US, India or 
Mainland China. The growing use of worm-based intrusions to spread spam, especially dubious or 
illegal products, has also been noted but as yet no arrests for spam/worm authors has been reported 
in the region. Spammed e-mails of bogus e-Banking websites of famous banks or financial institutes, 
(e.g. HSBC, Standard Chartered, Citibank or their hyperlinks) has also emerged in Hong Kong as an 
efficient means of locating victims. The unsuspecting (naive) victim is asked to submit their e-
Banking login ID and password for verification or security checking.53 
 
Illegal online gambling is also another new crime to emerge in China, but early cases simply used 
the Internet as a means to advertise activities rather than as an interactive gambling site. However, 
increased sophistication has been noted, with a recent trans-national illegal online gambling 
operation detected by the police in July 2004 and the arrest of 47 in Yiwu, Zhejiang Province, was 
connected with a casino in Burma. The police also found similar organisations in neighbouring 
counties and cities within Zhejiang Province and Shanghai.54 Beijing Customs have seized thousands 
of online gambling CDs since November 2003 following the 15 March 2003 seizure of 618 online 
gambling CDs sent from Switzerland. The recipients of were located in all 20 provinces of China 
                                                 
51 See <http://www.mailer/com.cn/article/articleprint/1602/-1/151>, visited 9 September 2004. 
52 Reuters Washington, ‘Fraudulent e-mail sent to Playstation witness to porn site’, SCMP, 26 April 2002. 
53 Personal communication, Mr Frank Law, Technology Crime Division, HKP. 
54 Peoples’ Net, 12 July 2004. 
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and it is suggested that online gambling organisations have begun to infiltrate China.55 Cases of this 
kind are relatively new in China and the local newspaper reports often headline them as the first in a 
province or city. An Internet gambling website was found hosted by a Hong Kong web-server. No 
person was arrested but the website was removed after advice and the ISP was warned of the 
possible violation of laws. 
 
Another problem arises with popular web-services such as UK site ‘Sharpmail’ that posted bogus e-
mails allowing the user to send messages from any address and re-routing the reply to the user’s 
personal mail. Although yet to be mimicked in Asia, this service has proved a bonus for pranksters, 
who have used it to send bogus messages to colleagues apparently from the bosses’ address (you’re 
fired!) or the local police (you’re needed for questioning).56 
 
[A] Public confidence 
 
Internet content liability and regulation issues are being addressed in the United States and Europe 
through a mix of direct legislation, industry self-regulation and third-party interventions.57 It is likely 
that governments outside the EU will begin drawing up privacy laws in the next three to five years. 
Given estimates that the e-business market in the Asia-Pacific will reach US$910 billion by 2004,58 
security of transactions must be addressed. Recent surveys in Japan and South Korea suggest that the 
degree of distrust of the way Asian websites handle privacy is greater than the distrust in the United 
States and Europe. Current figures released for the Asian region suggest that as many as one in ten 
online consumer transactions may involve fraud, with similar rates likely for business and 
government.59 As a result, the Asia Pacific Internet Association commissioned a study to explore the 
viability of self-regulation, and to outline a model code as well as a possible mechanism for self-
regulation. Key proposals included the voluntary labelling of websites under the Internet Content 
                                                 
55 China News Weekly, 29 March 2004 
56 Agencies Press (2004). Bogus E-mails Worry Police. SCMP, 21 August. 
57 As an example, the US directs the Internet Fraud Complaint Centre, while the UK is setting up the Centre for 
Cybercrime Complaints. ‘Calls for cybercrime database’, BBC news online, 29 August 2001, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid_1514000/1514215.stm>. 
58 Gartner Group survey, cited in M. Bray, ‘Fraud hits one in ten Asian Internet deals’, <CNN.com>, 20 March 2002; 
<http://www.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/asia/03/20/asia.net/>. 
59 Australian Institute of Criminology, ‘E-commerce fraud on the internet rarely reported’, Media Release, 17 January 
2002; <http://www.aic.gov.au/media/2002/20020117.html?. 
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Rating Association rating scheme.60 This would protect users and provide guidelines for business in 
the event of security breaches like fraud or child pornography or hate speech. 
 
[A] Content censorship61 
 
In April 1999 a Singapore law student complained after an anti-intrusion program she installed 
indicated that someone with an account in the Home Affairs Ministry had hacked into her computer. 
It was revealed that the internal-security agency had secretly scanned 200,000 computers to trace a 
virus. SingNet, the Internet service provider, acknowledged that it asked the Ministry’s IT security 
unit to scan its customers’ PCs for viruses without their consent. SingNet is owned by Singapore 
Telecom, which is in turn 80% owned by the government. The request to conduct the scan was 
reportedly made after the arrest of two youths who had hacked into 17 SingNet accounts.62 SingNet 
claimed the scanning did not ‘enter’ any PCs or compromise any personal data and that it found 900 
PCs infected with Trojan horse viruses that allowed hackers to enter computers via the Internet.63 
Nevertheless, public outcry over the incident eventually led to an official apology from SingNet 
 
A 2001 Council of Minister’s Resolution prohibits users within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 
publishing or accessing certain content on the Internet. Web traffic is apparently forwarded through 
a central array of proxy servers in the government’s Internet Services Unit. A Harvard study 
evaluated the scope and effectiveness of these filtering mechanisms and connections were made to 
the Internet through proxy servers in Saudi Arabia. The survey explored the effectiveness of the 
filtering mechanisms as well as the nature of the blocked pages. Of approximately 60,000 web-pages 
tested, the authors tracked 2038 blocked pages. These pages contained information about religion, 
health, education, reference, humour and entertainment.64 The authors concluded that ‘the Saudi 
government maintains an active interest in filtering non-sexually explicit Web content … substantial 
                                                 
60 H.A. Peng [n.d] Code of Practice For Internet Content Self-Regulation. Report to the Asia and Pacific Internet 
Association. Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; <http://www.apia.org/srexecutivesummary.htm>. 
61 I am greatly indebted to the discussion on this topic offered by Shannon, J.  & N. Thomas, 2004, ‘Human Security and 
Cyber-Security: Operationalising a Policy Framework’, in R. Broadhurst & P. Grabosky (Eds.). Cyber-Crime: The 
Challenge in Asia. University of Hong Kong Press. 
62 Singapore Government Scans 200,000 Users Computers. Asian Wall Street Journal, 6 May 1999. 
63 How personal are personal computers? Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 May 1999; 
<http://www.feer.com/Restricted/99may_20/tech.html>. 
64 J. Zittrain & B. Edelman [date?]. Documentation of Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia. Center for Internet and Society, 
Harvard Law School; <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/saudiarabia>. 
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amounts of non-sexually explicit Web content is in fact effectively inaccessible to most Saudi 
Arabians; and … much of this content consists of sites that are popular elsewhere in the world.’65  
 
The most frequent form of content censorship occurs when the government blocks or filters a 
website. Approximately 59 nation-states restrict public access to information by blocking Internet 
sites.66 The Saudi Arabia study showed that the censored websites included those relating to 
women’s rights, health issues and sexuality. The government cites the Koran, describing its filtering 
role as ‘preserving our Islamic values, filtering the Internet content to prevent the materials that 
contradict with our beliefs or may influence our culture’.67 In China, Internet filtering focuses on 
news sites and political content critical of the Party, reflecting concerns over political subversion, 
‘splittism’ and Taiwanese independence.68 Recently there have been further attempts at ‘cleaning’ 
media content in print, TV and the Internet, with standards of dress, content and language subject to 
‘decency’ tests. China has also blocked access to the search engines Google and Alta Vista, and 
news sites such as the BBC, SCMP and Amnesty International.69 It has also concluded agreements 
with search engines such as Yahoo! that prevent the posting of any information offensive to the 
Chinese Government.70  
 
In comparing the China and Saudi Arabia examples, where both countries censor materials deemed 
harmful, in the case of Saudi Arabia the emphasis is on the state’s role in aiding the security of the 
individual, whereas in China “…the emphasis is on the individual’s role in the security of the 
state”71, as part of the proactive strategy of encouraging self-censorship. This difference according to 
Shannon & Thomas is shown in the way sites are filtered by the two governments:  “Attempting to 
access a restricted site in Saudi Arabia results in an ‘access denied’ message appearing on screen, 
alongside information concerning the blocking policy and a request form for the government to 
reconsider its block on the site. Attempting to access a restricted site in China, however, results in a 
‘host not found’ message, leaving the user uncertain as to the cause of failure for the connection. 
Key word filtering and the discarding of e-mails containing key terms is also used by the Chinese 
                                                 
65 Ibid, cited in Shannon & Thomas (2004:339). 
66 Reporters Sans Frontières (2001). Enemies of the Internet. <http://www.rsf.org/ennemis.php3>. 
67 Cited in Zittrain & Edelman. Documentation of Internet filtering in Saudi Arabia. 
68 N. Shachtman (2002). Why countries make sites unseen. Wired, 18 July; 
<http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,53933-2,00.html>. 
69 M. Musgrove (2002). In China, some regain access to Google Site’, Washington Post, 13 September; 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/advertisers/popunders/verisign_oct02.html>. 
70 D. Lee, ‘Multinationals making a mint from China’s Great Firewall’, SCMP, 2 October 2002. 
71 Shannon & Thomas (2004:340) 
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authorities, but without informing its citizens as to exactly what the terms are and what words are in 
the lists” 72. Thus in Saudi Arabia a user knows what has happened and has a limited opportunity for 
corrective action, but in China the user is unable to take action as the actual cause of the ‘host not 
found’ message is unclear.  
 
As cultural values differ greatly within Asia, regional agreement on content and censorship has led 
to acknowledgment of these differences. The International Telecommunications Union for Asia and 
the Pacific argued that ‘the issue is not regulating Internet content per se, but protecting vulnerable 
groups with technical apparatus or regulatory measures’.73 In China, violations of its regulations can 
lead to the death penalty or imprisonment for relatively minor actions.74 In mid-October 2003, Luo 
Yongzhong was imprisoned for three years by the Changchun intermediate court in Jilin Province 
for eight anti-government postings in chatrooms.75 Since the introduction of the Internet in 1997, 
Vietnamese authorities have strictly controlled access to certain sites, following a regulatory system 
similar to that used in China.76 In another case in late 2003, Vietnamese journalist and cyber-
dissident Nguyen Vu Binh was sentenced to seven years’ jail for espionage after criticising 
Vietnam–China border accords, which were then e-mailed to other domestic groups as well as to 
lobby groups overseas.77 In Myanmar, where public access is denied, unauthorised use of a computer 
or a modem earns users up to 15 years in jail.78  
 
[A] Prevalence of recorded Internet crime 
 
For those jurisdictions which have in place substantive laws that criminalise various aspects of 
computer crime, statistics on known offences are consequently available. However, few law 
                                                 
72 Ibid 
73 The International Telecommunications Union Regional Preparatory Meeting, Asia and the Pacific, Policy and 
Regulation, Issue Paper for the World Telecommunication Development Conference, 2002; cited in Shannon & Thomas, 
Human Security and Cyber-Security. 
74 For discussion of state regulations regarding the Internet see Human Rights Watch. [n.d.] Freedom of Expression and 
the Internet in China: A Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, <www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/china-bck-0701.htm>. 
Two Chinese cyber-activists, Hu Mingjun and Wang Sen, were sentenced to death for spreading anti-socialist writings. 
Two others, Ouyang Yi and Li Zhi, are awaiting sentencing and trial (respectively) for similar anti-state cyber-behaviour 
that also carries the death penalty. 
75 China sentences another dissident for posting views on Internet. Agence France Presse, 22 October 2003. 
76 Reporters Sans Frontières (2002). Le Gouvernement Vietnamien Imite le Modèle Chinois de Contrôle de l’Internet. 7 
August; <http://www.rsf.fr/article.php3?id_article=3307>. 
77 S. Collinson (2003). US gives Vietnam a tongue lashing after cyber dissident jailed, Agence France Presse, 31 
December; and Vietnam: Cyber dissident jailed for seven years. Global News Wire. 5 January 2004. 
78 N. Shachtman (2002). Why Countries Make Sites Unseen. <Wired.com>,18 July 2002; 
<http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,53933,00.html>. 
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enforcement agencies distinguish data based on the precise nature of the ‘cyber-crime’. Data for 
Japan and Hong Kong are briefly discussed and the trends include significant changes in the nature 
of the offences reported and increases in more serious offences. For example, in Japan arrests for 
computer-related crimes involving the Internet were 31.7% of 262 arrests in 1997 and 29.9% of 415 
arrests in 1998, but by 2002 they accounted for 92.2% of all 1039 computer-related arrests, with a 
growing trend in fraud-like offences noted. In the case of Japan the majority of Internet-related 
crimes involved pornographic and associated offences.  
 
Table 3: Internet and computer crime in Japan  
 
  2000 2001 2002 
Crime against computer/data 44 63 30 
Computer fraud 33 48 18 
Illegal production/destruction of data 9 11 8 
 
Obstruction of business by destroying 
computer 
2 
4 
4 
Internet crime 484 712 958 
Child prostitution 114 117 268 
Child pornography 64 128 140 
Fraud 53 103 112 
Distribution of obscene object 154 103 109 
Violation juvenile protection ordinance 25 10 70 
Intimidation 18 40 33 
Infringement of copyright 29 28 31 
Defamation 30 42 27 
 
 
 
Others 78 14 168 
Unauthorised computer access 31 35 51 
 
Total 559 810 1039 
 
In January 2001, the Government of Japan launched its E-Japan Strategy, which has as its goal 
making Japan the world’s most advanced IT nation within five years. During 2002, the arrest 
number for cyber-crimes in Japan reached 1039, the highest so far. Among these, Internet crime 
increased 35% over the previous year. The number of content crimes made up 46% of reported cases 
and involved 408 child prostitution and child pornography cases, and 70 cases of violation of the 
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Juvenile Protection Ordinance (see Table 3). Arrests for fraud in online auctions also increased. 
Japan has established counselling consultations with victims about cyber-crime and during 2002 this 
was 19,329, an increase of 12% over the previous year (see Table 4). Of these, the number 
concerning online auctions was 3978 or 20.5%, consultations about fraud and criminal business on 
the network was 3193 or 16.5% 1.6 times that of the previous year and defamation cases 13.3% of 
all victims.79  
 
Table 4: Trends in cyber-crime victim counselling in Japan 
 
Type of victim    2000  2001  2002 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fraud     1396  1963  3193 
Internet auction    1301  2099  3978 
Defamation    1884  2267  2566 
Unauthorised access/virus  505  1335  1246 
Spam mail    1352  2647  2130 
Illegal information   2896  3282  2261 
Others     1801  3684  3955 
 
Total     11135  17277  19329 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: NPA 
 
Hong Kong police statistics for reported computer-related offences show rapid increases in hacking 
and deception offences and significant increases in 2003. ‘Content’ offences, on the other hand, have 
received serious attention only with the passage of child pornography laws late in 2003 which 
prohibit the possession and dissemination of child pornography; as yet no specific laws are in place 
to deal with hate crime. Although intrusion offences are often minor, they are now commonly seen 
in conjunction with deception offences. Intrusion offences are now more likely to be a predicate to 
more serious offences. Increases in 2003 were also associated with the popularity of online games in 
Hong Kong.  
                                                 
79 Details cited in Sato. Cyber crime countermeasures in Japan. An office worker (32) reproduced without permission the 
map survey software, which was being used in an office, exhibited the software on an FTP site on the Internet, and made 
it capable of being downloaded by the general public. In September 2002, Miyagi Prefectural Police arrested him for 
violation of the Copyright Law. 
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Conclusion 
 
Where data is available that distinguishes content offences, as in the case of Japan, the contribution 
of ‘content’ crimes is significant, but we know little about the extent and prevalence of even the 
content offences of greatest concern – child pornography and hate crimes. In respect to risks to 
children of unsolicited sexual contacts, we also have no clear data for Asia of the kind provided in 
the United States, where a 2001 study found that one in five of 10–17-year-olds had received such a 
contact in the preceding year, although 4% received ‘aggressive’ solicitations (off-line contact 
sought).80 However, a recently released survey conducted in March-April 2004 by Against Child 
Abuse of the on-line activities of 1,175 Hong Kong high-school students aged 12-15 showed that 
55% of them had made friends with strangers contacted on the Internet. Of these 39.5% went on to 
meet their on-line contact, 12.3% subsequently dated and 6.9% had sexual contact. A significant 
proportion (11.6%) suffered financial loss after meeting their on-line acquaintance and 9% were 
sexually assaulted or harassed81. Generally the ‘metrics’ of the prevalence or extent of these content 
crimes among, for example, the estimated 18 million active but volatile domains (in mid-2000) and 
1.4 billion publicly accessible pages are unreliable and few studies are available.82 Porn industry 
claims that e-commerce was developed because of the Internet’s advantages in pioneering the selling 
of Adult content are also highly questionable.83 However, businesses that provide content filtering 
software and services (such as online age verification services) are among the most profitable, 
particularly as these services are promoted as part of an integrated IT management for corporations 
and institutions. 
 
The cultural and jurisprudential diversity of Asia poses a challenge to the harmonisation of laws 
aimed at addressing the most serious aspects of hate crime and pornography. The relative 
effectiveness of many Asian jurisdictions at controlling the use of the Internet through proactive 
strategies (e.g. notably Singapore) also suggests that the Internet performs just as well as a means of 
propaganda as it does for putative reformers. This also suggests that relatively effective control of 
                                                 
80 The sample comprised 1501 teenagers who used the net regularly; see D. Finkelhor, K. Mitchell & J. Wolak (2001). 
Risk factors for and impact of online sexual solicitation. Journal of the American Medical Association. Cited at 
<www.caslon.com.au/securityguide11.htm>. 
81 Moy, P. (2004). Teens admit outings, sex with net strangers. SCMP, October 4, 2004: C3. 
82 E. O’Neil, B. Lavoie & R. Bennet (2003). Trends in the evolution of the public web, cited in 
<www.caslon.com.au/metricsguide1.htm>.  
83 See F. Lane (2000). Obscene Profits: The Entrepreneurs of Pornography in the Cyber Age. London: Routledge. 
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‘content’ crimes is possible and the development of geo-locational technologies may make 
transnational investigations more feasible. The low IT and Internet penetration in many of the Less 
Developed Countries of Asia also imply that cyber-policing remains vulnerable to ‘weakest link’ 
problems, although access controls may work effectively if the relevant expertise is available. Here 
the aid efforts of ‘liberal’ democracies may result in providing capabilities designed to fight cyber-
crime that is equally useful in censoring and controlling expression and cherished ‘free speech’. 
 
In relation to the ‘content crimes’ infesting cyberspace, there may be excessive hype over them but it 
seems increasingly clear that many jurisdictions including many in Asia will have to address the role 
of the Internet as a vector for hate and child pornography. Many Asian leaders will be less troubled 
by the curtailment of such individual ‘free speech’ in the context of their communitarian societies, 
but unless there is a modicum of agreement about how content crimes are defined, the prospects for 
a multilateral agreement are slight and are unlikely to be ‘smuggled’ into nascent consensus on the 
need to address other cyber-crime such as malicious code and Internet fraud. In the interim, self-
help, public opinion and responsible industry guidelines may enable such activities to be curtailed. 
